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ABSTRACT
This Article addresses the controversial “third prong” that some
courts add to the qualified immunity analysis in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases.
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, public officials are immune from
liability for civil rights violations so long as they do not violate clearly
established law. Courts have generally analyzed this qualified immunity
defense via a two-prong test—asking whether the official (1) violated the
plaintiff’s constitutional right, and (2) if so, asking whether that right was
“clearly established” at the time of the violation. However, certain circuits
add a third prong to the test, asking whether the official’s actions were
objectively reasonable in light of the clearly established law. Applying this
prong creates an additional barrier to plaintiffs in suits against government
officials in their individual capacities. Courts are not in agreement about
the propriety of the third prong, and in at least one circuit various panels
of the court are not even in agreement about its use. This Article addresses
how the prong can change the outcome in qualified immunity cases and
argues that its use is permitted and, in many cases, serves to better achieve
the goals of the qualified immunity doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, public officials sued in their
individual capacities are immune from liability for § 1983 civil rights
violations so long as they do not violate clearly established law.1 For
decades, the United States Supreme Court and lower courts have generally
analyzed this qualified immunity defense through a two-prong test—asking
whether the official: (1) violated the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (2)
if so, whether that right was “clearly established” at the time of the
violation.2 Some circuits, however, have added a third prong to the test in
certain cases, generally framed as whether the official’s actions were
objectively reasonable in light of the clearly established law.3 Courts are
not in agreement about the propriety of this third prong—in at least one
circuit, various panels of the court are not even in agreement.4
The purpose of this Article is to explore the existence and application
of the third prong of qualified immunity in the various circuits and the
Supreme Court, and to argue that the third prong is a permissible addition
1. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
2. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
3. See, e.g., Sample v. Bailey, 409 F.3d 689, 696 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005).
4. Compare Dunigan v. Noble, 390 F.3d 486, 491 n.6 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Despite
Saucier’s direction, some panels of this Court have continued to rely on a three step analysis
of qualified immunity claims . . . . Other panels acknowledge Saucier as binding. We take
the latter approach.” (internal citations omitted)), with Sample v. Bailey, 409 F.3d 689, 696
n.3 (6th Cir. 2005) (“One panel of this court has recently suggested that our three-step
approach for evaluating qualified immunity claims . . . is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court’s two-step inquiry outlined in Saucier . . . . We disagree . . . .” (internal citations
omitted)).
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to the analysis that courts have the discretion to use as they see fit. Part I
provides a background of the qualified immunity defense. Part II focuses
on the controversial third prong and illustrates how it can affect the outcome
of a case. Part III explores circuit opinions’ treatment of the prong. Part IV
analyzes the Supreme Court’s treatment (or lack thereof) of the issue, as
well as Supreme Court cases that are at least arguably consistent with its
use. Finally, Part V of this Article opines that courts are free to utilize the
third prong because it does not conflict with the Supreme Court’s treatment
of qualified immunity cases and may better serve the goals that qualified
immunity aims to achieve.
I. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND ITS GENERALLY ACCEPTED FIRST TWO
PRONGS
Qualified immunity protects government officials from suits brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (and federal officials from Bivens5 actions) in their
individual capacities. This immunity “gives government officials breathing
room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments . . . . [and] protects ‘all
but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’”6 The
Supreme Court established the modern formulation of qualified immunity
in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, where it held that the doctrine protects government
officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.”7 The qualified immunity doctrine
is judicially created8 and, as the Court has described it, is “the best attainable
accommodation of [the] competing values” of deterring the abuse of power

5. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 397 (1971). Section 1983 provides a remedy for persons injured by officials acting
under the color of state law. Although the statute does not provide a specific remedy for
plaintiffs whose constitutional rights were violated by agents of the federal government, the
Bivens Court recognized an implied cause of action, which is now commonly referred to as
a “Bivens action” and more or less tracks § 1983 case law.
6. Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.
335, 341 (1986)).
7. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
8. In recent months, qualified immunity has received national attention in light of the
2020 Black Lives Matter movement. Some federal judges have asserted that it should be
revisited. See Jamison v. McClendon, No. 3:16-CV-595-CWR-LRA, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 139327, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 4, 2020). However, whatever one’s thoughts are on
the propriety of the doctrine, the Supreme Court has denied numerous requests to revisit it.
So, unless it is changed by statute, it appears that it is here to stay for now. Whether the
qualified immunity doctrine should be modified or done away with is beyond the scope of
this Article.
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by government officials and preventing suits against government officials,
which would have a chilling effect on officials’ ability to actually serve the
public.9 The Court elaborated on the Harlow standard of qualified
immunity in Anderson v. Creighton, saying,
Somewhat more concretely, whether an official protected by qualified
immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official
action generally turns on the “objective legal reasonableness” of the
action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were “clearly established” at
the time it was taken.10

Since Anderson, as judicial doctrines often do, the test became more
crystalized, and finally, separated into numbered elements. The Court most
clearly recognized this numerical formulation in Saucier v. Katz.11 Under
Saucier, courts apply the test as two prongs: “[T]he first inquiry must be
whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged;
second, assuming the violation is established, the question [is] whether the
right was clearly established . . . .”12
As to the first prong, a plaintiff must plead (or provide evidence in
support at the summary judgment stage) that the defendant was personally
involved in the conduct that forms the basis of his complaint.13 The plaintiff
must also show that the defendant’s conduct constituted a violation of the
plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal right.14 For example, if a plaintiff
alleges that a police officer violated his First Amendment rights by arresting
him for videotaping the officer during a traffic stop, the plaintiff must plead
(or submit record evidence at the summary judgment stage to show) that
such conduct amounts to a violation of the First Amendment and that it was
in fact the defendant officer who committed the act.
As to the second prong, the court must determine whether the right
violated was “clearly established” at the time the violation occurred.15 In
9. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813–14. Before Harlow, the Court recognized a form of
immunity that involved a subjective good faith component, which is no longer part of the
analysis. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
10. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987) (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818–
19).
11. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
12. Id. at 200. As will be discussed in more detail below, the Court would later overrule
this framework in part, ruling that courts have discretion to approach these two elements in
either order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
13. Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002).
14. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200.
15. Id.
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other words, the court asks whether the state of the law was sufficient to
give the officer notice that his actions were unconstitutional. To do this,
courts “look first to decisions of the Supreme Court, then to [their] own
precedents, and then to decisions of other courts of appeal, and . . . ask
whether these precedents placed the constitutional question beyond
debate.”16
A plaintiff cannot satisfy this burden under the second prong “by
alleging [a] violation of extremely abstract rights.”17 Instead, case
precedent must make the “contours of the right . . . sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right.”18 So, using the videotape example above, the plaintiff must show
that a reasonable officer would have known—based on the state of the law
at the time—that the First Amendment protected the plaintiff’s right to film
a traffic stop.
Looking at Saucier and the Supreme Court’s other recent summaries
of qualified immunity, it would seem that a plaintiff need only satisfy those
two prongs to survive a defendant’s motion to dismiss or motion for
summary judgment.19 In other words, so long as the plaintiff can show that
the defendant officer violated his constitutional or federal statutory right,
and that the existence of that right was clearly established,20 the plaintiff’s
claim can proceed to trial. But the analysis does not always end there.
Instead, some circuits, and even panels within circuits, append a third prong
to the analysis.

16. Hearring v. Sliwowski, 712 F.3d 275, 280 (6th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
17. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987); see City & Cnty. of San Francisco
v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 611 (2015) (“Qualified immunity is no immunity at all if ‘clearly
established’ law can simply be defined as the right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures.”).
18. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640; see White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017).
19. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)
(affirming Saucier’s general two-step protocol but overruling its mandatory sequence of
analysis).
20. A number of other complicating factors, not addressed in this Article, arise under
the clearly established law prong, such as what law an officer is tasked with knowing. See,
e.g., David R. Cleveland, Clear as Mud: How the Uncertain Precedential Status of
Unpublished Opinions Muddles Qualified Immunity Determinations, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV.
45 (2010) (discussing federal circuits’ varying treatments of unpublished opinions in the
qualified immunity analysis); Garcia v. Does, 779 F.3d 84, 95 n.12 (2d Cir. 2015) (discussing
weight of out-of-circuit opinions). The Supreme Court itself has recognized that the issue
of what sources of law can clearly establish a right remains unsettled. D.C. v. Wesby, 138
S. Ct. 577, 591 n.8 (2018) (“We have not yet decided what precedents—other than our
own—qualify as controlling authority for purposes of qualified immunity.”).
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II. THE THIRD PRONG
Some federal circuits add a third prong to the qualified immunity
analysis.21 The prong varies slightly in its language from circuit to circuit.
The gist of it, however, was fairly summarized by the Sixth Circuit in
Srisavath v. City of Brentwood, which observed that “[o]n occasion, this
Court adds a third prong to the Saucier test, examining ‘whether the plaintiff
offered sufficient evidence to indicate that what the official allegedly did
was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly established
constitutional rights.’”22 In other words, if the official violated the
plaintiff’s constitutional right, and if the court finds that the right was clearly
established at the time, then the court may still ask a third question—was
the officer’s violation objectively unreasonable in light of the state of the
law at the time? This obviously adds to the plaintiff’s burden, and whether
it is permissible is up for debate.23
A. How The Third Prong Functions
The third prong serves to bridge the gap between the
clearly-established-right prong and the defendant’s actions in a particular
case. It allows the court to ask, as a matter of law, whether the defendant
acted objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly established law.24 The
21. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Maine, 469 F.3d 158, 169 (1st Cir. 2006) (“The third prong
of the qualified immunity analysis recognizes that law enforcement officials will in some
cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that their conduct is lawful; in such cases those
officials—like other officials who act in ways they reasonably believe to be lawful—should
not be held personally liable.” (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted));
Easley v. City of Riverside, 890 F.3d 851, 856 (9th Cir. 2018), rev’d on reh’g en banc on
other grounds, No. 16-5594, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 9821 (9th Cir. filed April 3, 2019);
accord Cunningham v. Shelby Cnty., No. 2:18-CV-02185-TLP-DKV, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 57154, at *57 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 1, 2020) (“The third and final question that the Court
must answer is whether Plaintiff has put forth enough evidence to indicate that what
Defendants allegedly did was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly established
constitutional rights.” (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted)).
22. Srisavath v. City of Brentwood, No. 06-6067, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 15053, at *912
(6th Cir. filed June 20, 2007) (quoting Estate of Carter v. City of Detroit, 408 F.3d 305, 310
n.2 (6th Cir. 2005)).
23. Compare, e.g., Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 166 (2d Cir. 2007) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (stating that the third prong, “[b]y splitting the ‘relevant, dispositive inquiry’ in
two, . . . erect[s] an additional hurdle” for qualified immunity claims, a hurdle “that has no
basis in Supreme Court precedent”) (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202), with Sample v. Bailey,
409 F.3d 689, 696 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005) (concluding that the three-prong approach “correctly
encompasses the Supreme Court’s approach to qualified immunity claims and serves to
ensure government officials the proper protection from civil suit under the law”).
24. See, e.g., Wilson v. City of Bos., 421 F.3d 45, 53 n.10, 58 (1st Cir. 2005).
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Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Gould v. Davis explains the function of the
prong, and how it is different than “reasonableness” in the more common
tort sense:
This [third] prong is the source of some confusion for the parties, who argue
in their briefs about whether “reasonableness” is a question of law, to be
decided by the court, or a question of fact that must be decided by a jury.
The parties misconstrue this part of the analysis, however, by arguing over
whether the officers’ behavior in this case was “reasonable.” The question
in qualified immunity is not whether the officers acted “reasonably” in the
sense in which that term is used in tort law. The question is whether a
reasonable person would have known about controlling law, once that law
is deemed to have been clearly established under the second prong. The
concept of objective reasonableness, as used in qualified immunity, is not a
freestanding evaluation of the “reasonableness” of an officer’s actions. 25

Objective reasonableness in the qualified immunity framework is a
separate hurdle of a purely legal nature that the court should address, at least
as far as the Fourth Circuit surmises.26
What actual effect, if any, the third prong has on cases is also up for
debate.27 Some courts (and even panels within courts) suggest that it is little
more than a reformulation of the two-prong test and that, “[r]egardless of
how the test is articulated, a defendant will only be held liable if his or her
actions were objectively unreasonable in view of clearly established law.”28
The First Circuit, on the other hand, describes the third prong as “often the
most difficult one for the plaintiff to prevail upon.”29 At a minimum, the
prong obviously raises the number of hurdles the plaintiff must jump from
two to three. And, as explained below, the third prong has proven
outcome-determinative in some cases.
A good example of a case where the third prong made all the difference
comes from the Second Circuit’s two-to-one ruling in Taravella v. Town of

25. Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 272–73 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted).
See generally Batt v. Buccilli, No. 17-1210, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 3635, at *27 (2d Cir.
Feb. 16, 2018) (“The question is not what a lawyer would learn or intuit from researching
case law, but what a reasonable person in the defendant’s position should have known about
the constitutionality of his conduct.” (alterations and citation omitted)).
26. Gould, 165 F.3d at 273.
27. See Srisavath, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 15053, at *912 (discussing the application of
the third prong by some courts and its effect).
28. Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 615 n.4 (6th Cir. 2014).
29. Wilson, 421 F.3d at 57–58.
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Wolcott.30 Taravella involved an employment due process claim by a
former town employee against the town’s mayor.31 The employee, former
senior center director Denise Taravella, was fired by the town’s new Mayor,
Thomas Dunn.32 Taravella sued the Mayor, asserting that she was entitled
to, and deprived of, a pre-termination meeting and protection from
termination without cause.33 The terms of her employment were
memorialized in a Letter of Benefits Agreement that both sides of the
opinion agreed was ambiguous.34 The defendant, Mayor Dunn, asserted
that he was entitled to qualified immunity; the majority of the Second
Circuit agreed—based exclusively on the third prong.35
As to the first prong, the court found that the right Taravella asserted,
a due process property interest in her government job protecting her from
termination without cause, existed.36 The court also found that the second
prong was satisfied, stating that “because this principle [that government
employees have a right to a termination hearing] has been clearly
established since Loudermill, the second prong of the qualified immunity
analysis would appear to be satisfied.”37 And yet, the court found that the
Mayor was nonetheless immune based on the third prong.38 The ambiguous
nature of the Letter of Benefits Agreement formed the basis of the court’s
ruling, which Taravella argued provided her the protection against
termination without cause.39
We conclude that Dunn’s conduct was objectively reasonable as a matter of
law . . . . [T]he Agreement is ambiguous as a matter of law. Dunn read the
Agreement, sought legal advice, and reasonably concluded that Taravella
could be terminated without a hearing. Because a reasonable mayor could
understand the Agreement to provide that Taravella could be fired without
a hearing, it cannot be said that Dunn acted unreasonably in doing so.”40

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Taravella v. Town of Wolcott, 599 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2010).
Id. at 131–32.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 134–35.
Id. at 134.
Id.
Id. at 134–35.
Id. at 135.
Id.

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol43/iss3/5

8

Whitwell: How Qualified is Qualified Immunity: Adding a Third Prong to the

2021]

HOW QUALIFIED IS QUALIFIED IMMUNITY?

411

Under this fact-intensive application of the third prong, the Second
Circuit found that qualified immunity applied.41
Judge Straub dissented in Taravella, arguing (among other things) that
the third prong was a result of confusing Second Circuit precedent that had
been abrogated by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Saucier.42 Judge Straub
would ultimately win the day because, as discussed below, the Second
Circuit would go on to move away from the third prong entirely in 2016.43
Nonetheless, the majority ruling in Taravella shows that the third prong has
teeth and can be outcome-determinative.
Another case where the third prong was the determining factor is Liebe
v. Norton, where the plaintiff alleged that individual Defendant Prison
Guard, Lyle Norton, failed to prevent the suicide of an inmate on suicide
watch.44 The Eighth Circuit found that the claim met the first and second
prongs, but that the third prong entitled Norton to qualified immunity.45 The
way the court applied the prong, however, was less clear-cut. The court
began its analysis:
It is the third prong of the qualified immunity test which is the crux of this
appeal. This prong, regarding whether a reasonable official would have
known that his conduct violated a constitutional right, involves both an
objective and subjective component. The objective component examines
whether a serious deprivation occurred. The subjective component
examines Norton’s state of mind, and requires that he acted with “deliberate
indifference.” The district court held that this prong was not met because
Norton’s actions did not amount to deliberate indifference. We agree.46

This analysis is confusing because it seems to draw on questions that
are more applicable to the first prong—whether the defendant violated
plaintiff’s constitutional rights. And in fact, the court’s conclusion that
“Norton may have been negligent in not checking on Liebe more often, or
in failing to notice the exposed electrical conduit in the temporary holding
cell, . . . [but not] indifferent,”47 is almost identical to opinions in other
inmate-suicide cases where the same determination led to a finding that the
41. Id.
42. Id. at 136–41. Judge Straub also relied heavily on former Second Circuit Judge
Sotomayor’s concurrence in Walczyk, discussed in more detail below. See infra notes 85–
87 and accompanying text.
43. Ricciuti v. Gyzenis, 834 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2016).
44. Liebe v. Norton, 157 F.3d 574, 576 (8th Cir. 1998).
45. Id. at 577.
46. Id. (internal citations omitted).
47. Id. at 578.
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first prong—a constitutional violation—was not satisfied.48 Liebe thus
shows that the third prong can overlap with the other two prongs, sometimes
to the point that it seems to simply be a reformulation of one or the other of
them. But, as the circuit court framed it, it was nonetheless the third prong
that carried the day for the defendant.49
B. Miscellaneous Issues: Objective Reasonableness Under the Fourth
Amendment and the Saucier Order-of-Battle
Before exploring other courts’ takes on the third prong, a discussion of
the question would not be complete without addressing two issues that may
further convolute the role of the third prong: its overlap with the Fourth
Amendment and the Saucier order-of-battle rule.
Fourth Amendment cases present a complication to the use of the third
prong as an “objective reasonableness” standard because “objective
reasonableness” is also the standard for whether an officer’s use of force
amounts to a constitutional violation.50 In other words, to overcome the first
prong of qualified immunity in an excessive force case, the plaintiff must
plead or prove that the officer’s use of force was not objectively reasonable.
Assuming the plaintiff proves as much, and then goes on to satisfy the
second prong (showing that the officer’s objectively unreasonable use of
force was clearly established as unlawful), then the third prong would
appear to be redundant in light of the first. It would require the court to ask
whether the officer, who acted objectively unreasonably and violated
clearly established law, also acted objectively unreasonably in light of
clearly established law. The Saucier Court partially addressed this issue,
ruling that objective reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment did not
consume the qualified immunity analysis. In doing so, Saucier’s reasoning
suggests that the third prong has a place in the analysis. The Court reasoned
that an excessive force analysis involves
a list of factors relevant to the merits of the constitutional excessive force
claim, requiring careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each
particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.
If an officer reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that a suspect was likely

48. See, e.g., Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 2013).
49. Liebe, 157 F.3d at 577; see also Wilson v. City of Bos., 421 F.3d 45, 58 (1st Cir.
2005).
50. See generally Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
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to fight back, for instance, the officer would be justified in using more force
than in fact was needed.51

The Court went on to explain that “[t]he qualified immunity inquiry,
on the other hand, has a further dimension. The concern of the immunity
inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the
legal constraints on particular police conduct.”52 Because an officer may
misconstrue how a legal doctrine applies to the facts he faces, if his “mistake
as to what the law requires is reasonable,” he is immune.53 While the
question of appending a numbered third prong was not before the Saucier
Court, the ruling nonetheless suggests that an official’s objective
reasonableness as to the state of the law is distinct from the questions posed
in the first two prongs, and is indeed a “further dimension” of qualified
immunity.54
The other issue that may complicate the matter is the old
order-of-battle rule. When the Court solidified the qualified immunity
analysis in Saucier, it also held—in a ruling so unpopular that it would later
be completely reversed—that courts were required to conduct the
two-pronged analysis in order.55 So, a district court faced with the First
Amendment police-videotape example above could not grant a motion to
dismiss the claim against the officer simply by finding that, regardless of
whether the right was violated, it was not clearly established. Instead, the
court had to begin its analysis with the first prong. The Court reversed this
part of Saucier nine years later in Pearson v. Callahan, ruling that the
sequential order of battle may be a helpful way to analyze qualified
immunity, but that it is not a requirement.56 The ruling did not address a
numeric third prong, but the Court’s retreat from the rigid order-of-battle
sequence does not run contrary to those circuits which have found that
objective legal reasonableness can have a place in the analysis, perhaps even
as a formal third prong.

51. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001) (emphasis added) (internal citations,
quotation marks, and bracket omitted).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 200 (“[T]he requisites of a qualified immunity defense must be considered in
proper sequence.”).
56. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
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III. CIRCUIT COURT TREATMENT OF THE THIRD PRONG
Circuit courts are not in agreement as to whether, and when, to use the
third prong. As the Second Circuit put it, this “additional ‘reasonableness’
hurdle a plaintiff must satisfy to prevail in a suit against a public officer
alleging a constitutional tort has not been without controversy.”57
Some circuits, like the Fourth Circuit, explicitly add the third prong.58
Others use the third prong but describe it as a mere subset of the second
prong.59 For instance, as the Fifth Circuit reasoned,
[T]he second prong of the qualified immunity test is better understood as
two separate inquiries: whether the allegedly violated constitutional rights
were clearly established at the time of the incident; and, if so, whether the
conduct of the defendants was objectively unreasonable in the light of that
then clearly established law.60

Other courts, such as the Second and Eighth Circuits, employed the
third prong for a time and then moved away from it. The Eighth Circuit
employed the third prong until around 2001.61 But for reasons that are not

57. Ricciuti v. Gyzenis, 834 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).
58. See, e.g., Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 272 (4th Cir. 1998) (“In the final prong of
the qualified immunity analysis, we must determine whether a reasonable person in the
officers’ position would have known that his actions violated the right alleged by the
plaintiff.”).
59. See, e.g., Whalen v. Massachusetts Trial Court, 397 F.3d 19, 27 n.9 (1st Cir. 2005)
(“We note that, on occasion, we have combined the second and third prongs of the qualified
immunity analysis into a single step.” (citations omitted)).
60. Estate of Sorrells v. City of Dallas, No. 01-10610, 2002 WL 1899592, at *2 (5th
Cir. July 10, 2002) (quoting Hare v. City of Corinth, 135 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 1998)); see
also Tremblay v. McClellan, 350 F.3d 195, 200 (1st Cir. 2003) (“Even were a reasonable
suspicion constitutional standard clearly established in 1999 for these circumstances, the
question would be whether an objectively reasonable officer in Officer McClellan’s position
could have understood that his actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment. This question
could be considered to merge the second and third prongs of the immunity analysis.”); Easley
v. City of Riverside, 890 F.3d 851, 856 (9th Cir. 2018), rev’d on reh’g en banc on other
grounds, No. 16-55941, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 9821 (9th Cir. filed April 3, 2019) (“The
second prong requires us to analyze two discrete sub-elements: ‘whether the law governing
the conduct at issue was clearly established’ and ‘whether the facts as alleged could support
a reasonable belief that the conduct in question conformed to the established law.’” (quoting
Green v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 751 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2014))).
61. See Feist v. Simonson, 222 F.3d 455, 462 (8th Cir. 2000), overruled on other
grounds by Helseth v. Burch, 258 F.3d 867, 871 (8th Cir. 2001).
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abundantly clear, the Eight Circuit no longer uses the prong.62 Instead,
somewhere along the line, the court merged the second and third prongs and
finally dispensed with the third prong altogether.63 The Second Circuit used
it for a time,64 but then moved away from it in Ricciuti v. Gyzenis, and
seemed to acknowledge that the prong’s foothold was questionable, stating
that it “need not resolve whether the ‘reasonableness’ of a
defendant-officer’s belief that his conduct did not violate the law is an
independent basis for granting qualified immunity . . . .”65 These circuits
do not currently utilize the prong but have not spoken in a definitive voice
as to whether it may have a place in some future case.
The Seventh Circuit is the court most decidedly against the use of the
third prong. In Jones v. Wilhelm, the court addressed the issue head on:
“Wilhelm urges us to append a third prong to the two-part Saucier test,
contending that ‘even if the Court finds that there was clearly established
law which was violated, the immunity question should be decided based on
whether police officers acted reasonably under the circumstances they
faced.’”66 Saucier (which the Seventh Circuit referenced) states that “[t]he
relevant, dispositive inquiry is whether it would be clear to a reasonable
officer that the conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”67
Perhaps somewhat confusingly, the Seventh Circuit deduced from this
Saucier language that it “goes without saying” that the officer’s objective
reasonableness has no part in the discussion.68 Thus, the court held that
“qualified immunity remains a two-part test which first examines whether
the defendant’s alleged actions constitute a violation of constitutional rights,
and then determines whether the implicated right was clearly established at
the time.”69
The Sixth Circuit’s take, on the other hand, is perhaps the murkiest, as
different panels of the Sixth Circuit expressly disagree with each other
about the issue. For instance, one panel of the Sixth Circuit in Dunigan v.
Noble70 made the observation in a footnote that “[d]espite Saucier’s
62. See Tlamka v. Serrell, 244 F.3d 628, 632 (8th Cir. 2001); Wilson v. Lawrence Cnty.,
260 F.3d 946, 951 (8th Cir. 2001); Henderson v. Munn, 439 F.3d 497, 501–02 (8th Cir.
2006); Howard v. Kansas City Police Dep’t, 570 F.3d 984, 988 (8th Cir. 2009).
63. See generally Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
64. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149, 154–55 (2d Cir. 2013);
Edwards v. Arnone, No. 14-329, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 9107, at *2 (2d Cir. June 2, 2015).
65. Ricciuti v. Gyzenis, 834 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2016).
66. Jones v. Wilhelm, 425 F.3d 455, 460 (7th Cir. 2005).
67. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 197.
68. Jones, 425 F.3d at 461.
69. Id.
70. Dunigan v. Noble, 390 F.3d 486, 491 n.6 (6th Cir. 2004).
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direction, some panels of this Court have continued to rely on a three step
analysis of qualified immunity claims grounded in our pre-Saucier en banc
decision in Williams v. Mehra . . . . Other panels acknowledge Saucier as
binding . . . . We take the latter approach.”71
The following year, another panel responded to the Dunigan footnote
with its own footnote, stating, “One panel of this court has recently
suggested that our three-step approach for evaluating qualified immunity
claims . . . is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s two-step inquiry
outlined in Saucier . . . . We disagree.”72 Ten years later, a panel of the
Sixth Circuit in Robertson v. Lucas continued to use the prong, observing
that “[w]e have, from time to time, elaborated a third step in the qualified
immunity analysis: ‘whether the plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence “to
indicate that what the official allegedly did was objectively unreasonable in
light of the clearly established constitutional rights.’” . . . This requirement
is implicit in the two-step approach.”73 Obviously, these approaches are at
odds. But, the Sixth Circuit has also recognized that “one panel cannot
overrule a pre-existing decision of another panel.”74 So, unless the Supreme
Court or an en banc panel squarely addresses the issue, the panels appear to
be at a respectful impasse.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S TREATMENT (OR LACK THEREOF) OF THE
THIRD PRONG
The Supreme Court has never explicitly suggested that it intends to
move from the two-prong structure.75 However, the language it used in
Anderson—a fundamental qualified immunity case—suggests that
“objective reasonableness” has a place somewhere in the analysis.76 And,
as will be explained in more detail below, the Court was once specifically
asked to consider the issue of the third prong and did not address it.
71. Id. (internal citations omitted).
72. Sample v. Bailey, 409 F.3d 689, 696 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Dunigan, 390 F.3d
at 491 n.6).
73. Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 615 n.4 (6th Cir. 2014) (internal citations
omitted); see also Cunningham v. Shelby Cnty., No. 2:18-CV-02185-TLP-DKV, 2020 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 57154, at *24 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 1, 2020) (continuing to use all three prongs).
74. Spengler v. Worthington Cylinders, 615 F.3d 481, 491 n.4 (6th Cir. 2010).
75. Some of the courts that use the third prong have acknowledged as much. See, e.g.,
Estate of Carter v. City of Detroit, 408 F.3d 305, 311 n.2 (6th Cir. 2005) (“In cases
subsequent to Saucier the Supreme Court has not formally broken up the two steps
prescribed by Saucier into three steps, . . . but the three-step approach may in some cases
increase the clarity of the proper analysis.” (citing Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004);
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563 (2004))).
76. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639–40 (1987).
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In Anderson, the Court hinted at the idea of objective legal
reasonableness when discussing another often-debated issue of qualified
immunity—how generally or specifically a right must be defined to be
“clearly established.”77 In answering this question (for perhaps the first
time, but far from the last78), the Court gave an explanation that would just
as readily apply in arguing in support of the third prong:
The operation of this standard . . . depends substantially upon the level of
generality at which the relevant “legal rule” is to be identified. For example,
the right to due process of law is quite clearly established by the Due
Process Clause, and thus there is a sense in which any action that violates
that Clause (no matter how unclear it may be that the particular action is a
violation) violates a clearly established right. Much the same could be said
of any other constitutional or statutory violation. 79

But, the Court explained, “if the test of ‘clearly established law’ were
to be applied at this level of generality, it would bear no relationship to the
‘objective legal reasonableness’ that is the touchstone of Harlow.”80 And
such an approach “would destroy ‘the balance that our cases strike between
the interests in vindication of citizens’ constitutional rights and in public
officials’ effective performance of their duties,’ by making it impossible for
officials ‘reasonably [to] anticipate when their conduct may give rise to
liability for damages.’”81 Thus, under the clearly-established-law analysis,
the “contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”82 This
explanation by the Court of the second prong suggests that there must be
some level of fact application of the purported right at issue in order to
determine whether it is clearly established as to those facts. It almost
necessarily follows that the question of whether a reasonable officer would
know that what “he is doing” is unconstitutional requires an analysis of
objective reasonableness.

77. Id. at 640.
78. This question is, perhaps, the most frequently litigated qualified immunity issue that
comes before the Court. See e.g., Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (“This
Court has ‘repeatedly told courts—and the Ninth Circuit in particular—not to define clearly
established law at a high level of generality.’” (citing City & Cnty. of San Francisco v.
Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775–76 (2015))).
79. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639.
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. Id. (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984) (alteration in original)).
82. Id. at 640 (emphasis added).
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Along the same lines, Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Groh v. Ramirez83
suggests that whether an officer acted objectively reasonably in light of the
state of the law is a part of the qualified immunity framework.
The central question is whether someone in the officer’s position could
reasonably but mistakenly conclude that his conduct complied with the
Fourth Amendment. An officer might reach such a mistaken conclusion for
several reasons. He may be unaware of existing law and how it should be
applied. Alternatively, he may misunderstand important facts about the
search and assess the legality of his conduct based on that
misunderstanding . . . . Finally, an officer may misunderstand elements of
both the facts and the law . . . . Our qualified immunity doctrine applies
regardless of whether the officer’s error is a mistake of law, a mistake of
fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.84

In short, rulings and dissents from the Supreme Court show that
objective legal reasonableness has a place in the analysis, albeit not
explicitly in a numbered prong—at least not yet.
Justice Sotomayor is the only member of the Court who has explicitly
addressed the issue of whether a third numbered prong is part of the
platform. She was decidedly against it. While still a Circuit Judge for the
Second Circuit, Justice Sotomayor addressed the issue in a concurrence in
Walczyk v. Rio:
Contrary to what our case law might suggest, the Supreme Court does not
follow this “clearly established” inquiry with a second, ad hoc inquiry into
the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct. Once we determine whether
the right at issue was clearly established for the particular context that the
officer faced, the qualified immunity inquiry is complete.85

Justice Sotomayor also noted the obvious benefit to defendants of
adding the prong: “By splitting the ‘relevant, dispositive inquiry’ in two, we
erect an additional hurdle to civil rights claims against public officials that
has no basis in Supreme Court precedent.”86 She went on to say:

83. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004).
84. Id. at 566–67 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
85. Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 166–67 (2d Cir. 2007) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 166. As the First Circuit put it, the third prong is “often the most difficult one
for the plaintiff to prevail upon . . . .” Wilson v. City of Boston., 421 F.3d 45, 57–58 (1st
Cir. 2005).
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I recognize that the distinction I am drawing is a fine one, but I believe it
has real consequences. Our approach does not simply divide into two steps
what the Supreme Court treats singly, asking first, whether the right is
clearly established as a general proposition, and second, whether the
application of the general right to the facts of this case is something a
reasonable officer could be expected to anticipate. Instead, we permit courts
to decide that official conduct was “reasonable” even after finding that it
violated clearly established law in the particularized sense. By introducing
reasonableness as a separate step, we give defendants a second bite at the
immunity apple, thereby thwarting a careful balance that the Supreme Court
has struck “between the interests in vindication of citizens’ constitutional
rights and in public officials’ effective performance of their duties.”87

If the Supreme Court were ever to address the issue of the third prong
directly, the Walczyk concurrence certainly suggests that Justice Sotomayor
would be against it.
Since Walczyk, the Supreme Court has had an opportunity to squarely
answer the question, but instead side-stepped a deep dive into the issue in
Tolan v. Cotton.88 The per curiam ruling in Tolan appears fairly
unassuming with respect to the third prong; in fact, the opinion does not
even mention it. But what is not apparent from the opinion is that the parties
explicitly and extensively briefed the issue of the third prong, and even
explained the disagreements between the circuits on the issue.89 Despite
lengthy and detailed arguments from the parties, the Court did not take up
the issue of the third prong’s propriety. Instead, the focus of the Court’s
ruling dealt with a separate issue involving the summary judgment standard.
In framing the question, the Court only generically noted, “In resolving
questions of qualified immunity at summary judgment, courts engage in a
two-pronged inquiry.”90 The main thrust of the ruling did not otherwise
address the third-prong debate. Thus, Tolan suggests that the Court might
not have adopted the third prong, but neither did it reject it or show any
interest in fleshing out the issue, nor in retreating from Anderson’s
recognition of objective legal reasonableness.

87. Walczyk, 496 F.3d at 168–69 (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639).
88. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (2014).
89. See Reply Brief for Appellants, Tolan v. Cotton, No. 12-20296, 2012 WL 12332298
(5th Cir. 2012).
90. Tolan, 572 U.S. at 655.
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Since Tolan, some circuit courts have continued to use the third
prong.91 This may be because, without digging deeply into the briefing in
Tolan, it is not apparent that the Tolan Court was presented with the
opportunity to address the question. Or, it may be because, as asserted
elsewhere in this Article, the Court’s precedent seems to leave room for an
objective legal reasonableness analysis in qualified immunity cases.
Moreover, a more recent opinion from the Supreme Court suggests that
the Court is not averse to using the third prong in practice, although not by
name. The year after Tolan, the Supreme Court in Mullenix v. Luna found
that a police officer was entitled to qualified immunity after shooting a
suspect during a high-speed chase.92 At the outset of the analysis, the Court
stated that it was only deciding the issue based on the second (clearly
established law) prong.93 Despite framing the analysis in those terms, the
actual meat of the opinion focused as much on the reasonableness of the
officer’s actions as on the state of the law at the time he acted.94
“Ultimately, whatever can be said of the wisdom of [Officer] Mullenix’s
choice, this Court’s precedents do not place the conclusion that he acted
unreasonably in these circumstances ‘beyond debate.’”95 Although framed
as a clearly-established-law analysis, the substance of the Mullenix opinion
appears closer to the third prong—whether the officer’s actions were
objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law—than the
second prong.
CONCLUSION
The third prong furthers the purpose of qualified immunity, which is
to provide more protection to government officials than defendants in other
kinds of cases. Without the third prong, the first prong adds no protection
at all. For example, the basic question that a court must answer in reviewing
91. See, e.g., Easley v. City of Riverside, 890 F.3d 851, 856 (9th Cir. 2018), rev’d on
reh’g en banc on other grounds, No. 16-55941, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 9821 (9th Cir. filed
April 3, 2019); Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 615 (6th Cir. 2014).
92. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 313 (2015).
93. Id. at 308 (“We address only the qualified immunity question, not whether there was
a Fourth Amendment violation in the first place . . . .”).
94. See id. at 311.
95. Id. (“Without implying that Lytle was either correct or incorrect, it suffices to say
that Lytle does not clearly dictate the conclusion that Mullenix was unjustified in perceiving
grave danger and responding accordingly, given that Leija was speeding towards a
confrontation with officers he had threatened to kill.”); id. at 309 (“[I]t would be
unreasonable to expect a police officer to make the numerous legal conclusions necessary to
apply Garner to a high-speed car chase . . . .”) (quoting Pasco v. Knoblauch, 566 F.3d 572,
580 (5th Cir. 2009)) (alteration in original)).
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a motion to dismiss or summary judgment motion in any case is whether
the plaintiff makes out a claim for which relief can be granted (e.g., whether
a car wreck plaintiff makes out a claim for negligence, or an employee
makes out a claim for discrimination under Title VII). In § 1983 cases, the
baseline inquiry is no different; if a plaintiff alleges that an officer violated
his constitutional right, and the court finds this not to be the case, the
plaintiff loses.96 The Saucier framework demonstrates that “courts
must . . . answer the constitutional question as if there were no such thing
as qualified immunity,” and separately ask “whether the additional
protections of qualified immunity are available.”97 In other words, the first
prong of qualified immunity is no real immunity at all; it simply gives the
defendant the same right as any other defendant—the right to ask the court
to find that as a matter of law his alleged conduct is not actionable.
However, the third prong gives the first prong added value. It
recognizes, as Saucier did, that qualified immunity has a “further
dimension” than just the standard, dispositive-motion hurdles that any
plaintiff faces.98 As the Supreme Court in Anderson similarly recognized,
objective legal reasonableness is the “touchstone” of Harlow and, without
it, “Harlow would be transformed from a guarantee of immunity into a rule
of pleading.”99 The third prong raises the burden beyond simply requiring
plaintiffs to establish a cause of action, which is the same burden plaintiffs
face in any context. Under the third prong, the plaintiff must plead or prove
that the defendant acted objectively unreasonably in light of clearly
established law.
And as a pro-third-prong panel of the Sixth Circuit recognized in
Bailey, the prong is not without a basis in Supreme Court case law. Rather,
the third prong “directly flows” from the Anderson and Saucier Courts’
recognition that “‛[i]f the officer’s mistake as to what the law requires is
reasonable . . . the officer is entitled to the immunity defense.’”100 This
approach is more consistent with the Court’s goal of protecting government
officials from litigation when it “would be [un]clear to a reasonable
[official] that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” 101
96. See, e.g., Alberici v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. CV 12-10511-JFW (VBKx), 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146362, at *91 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2013) (“Because the Court concludes
that there was no constitutional violation, it need not reach the second step of the Saucier
analysis.”).
97. Wilson v. City of Bos., 421 F.3d 45, 55 (1st Cir. 2005).
98. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205.
99. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).
100. Sample v. Bailey, 409 F.3d 689, 696 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at
205).
101. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.
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“Qualified immunity serves to insulate public officials ‘from undue
interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of
liability.’”102 Although courts are not required to employ the third prong in
all cases, they appear to be free to elect to do so, and doing so may better
strike the balance qualified immunity seeks to achieve.

102. Swanson v. Town of Mountain View, 577 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982)).
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